Yo tampoco lo soy, y si bien siento el impacto directo de sus efectos en mi bolsillo , la teoría y la practica de este tema se la dejo a los que saben de esto, a los doctores en economia.Quinoa escribió: Lun Dic 30, 2024 6:40 pm Yo no soy economista y hay cosas que no me cuadran en todo ese asunto.
El CATO Institute tiene un articulo muy bueno sobre esto. No tiene perdia, te lo recomiendo mucho pues ilustra esto en términos sencillos:
Separating Tariff Facts from Tariff Fictions
https://www.cato.org/publications/separ ... ts-tariffs
Lo que si esta claro es que en su mayoría los economistas están en contra de los aranceles aduanales con fines proteccionistas. Revisa la figura 5 del articulo arriba. El articulo además da cuenta de lo siguiente:
What Do Tariffs Do, and Who Really Benefits from Tariffs?
In a survey of literature related to US trade protection from America’s Founding to the present day, covering tariffs on a wide range of industries and goods, the Cato Institute’s Scott Lincicome concludes, “In no case can it confidently be said that American protectionism was a substantial cause of American prosperity or the flourishing of protected US industries. Most often, import restrictions have been abject failures, imposing massive costs on US consumers, workers, and companies without achieving their intended objectives.” The United States has famously tried, and failed, to revive several industries with tariff protection, including shoes, softwood lumber, sugar, steel, tires, motorcycles, certain manufacturing goods, apparel, and textiles.
Can Tariffs Change the Balance of Trade?
Another common motivation for increasing tariffs is to reduce the trade (technically, the “current account”) deficit. While tariffs can certainly reduce imports, their effect on the trade balance is more complicated. In fact, both theory and practice show that because tariffs also decrease exports (and thus the overall level of trade), the measures do not fundamentally alter the current account balance in the long run.
As Daniel Griswold and Andreas Freytag documented in a 2023 Cato Institute paper and as Figure 6 shows, the 2018–2019 tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and since maintained by the Biden administration “had no discernible impact on the relative size of the trade deficit”; if anything, the deficit actually increased slightly versus where it was at the end of the Obama administration. Citing some of the aforementioned studies on the tariffs’ other effects, Griswold and Freytag thus conclude that “higher tariffs did exactly what the economics literature predicted they would do: impose net economic harm without changing the current account balance.”
Overall, empirical research demonstrates that countries maintaining higher tariffs actually tend to have larger trade deficits and that tariffs have little if any direct effect on the balance of trade.
What Else Happens When Tariffs Are Imposed?
The 2018–2019 tariffs are again instructive here. First, there was the inevitable retaliation. Governments of China, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, as well as nations with smaller levels of trade with the United States, quickly responded with tariffs on American products. Research shows, moreover, that the retaliatory tariffs were politically motivated, targeting products that would disproportionately impact counties that supported Donald Trump in the 2016 election. And in contrast to the near-complete pass-through of US tariffs to US consumers, US exporters bore an estimated 50 percent of retaliatory tariffs because they lowered their export prices to stay competitive in the markets at issue. (They were mainly exporting agricultural commodities that would be easy for foreign importers to source elsewhere.)
This retaliation was costly—for American exporters and taxpayers. The Department of Agriculture estimated that direct export losses from the retaliatory tariffs totaled $27 billion during 2018 through the end of 2019. US market share of China’s total agricultural imports fell from 20 percent in 2017 to 12 percent in 2018, remained significantly depressed in 2019 at 10 percent, and had not recovered by February 2021. Then, to compensate politically influential US farmers for the damages, the US government gave them nearly $25 billion in direct subsidy payments (in addition to the usual US farm subsidies).
Conclusion
American history provides an abundance of examples of politicians using tariffs to protect domestic industry. Taken together, the examples show that tariffs do not generate higher levels of employment or production for the economy overall; they do not ensure the long-term health of the industries being protected or fundamentally alter the trade balance; and they serve not the strategic interests of the nation but the parochial interests of politicians who get to enrich preferred companies and workers by imposing diffuse and mostly hidden costs on the rest of the US economy.
